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Given the UK has one of the largest contingents of MEPs, how will Brexit change the way political
parties are aligned in the European Parliament? Angelos Chryssogelos writes that the eﬀects of
removing British MEPs from the Parliament will be wide-ranging, with sovereigntist forces potentially
strengthened inside the centre-right EPP, the centre-left S&D becoming more oriented toward an
anti-austerity platform, and Eurosceptic forces more likely to consolidate around the ENF group led
by Marine Le Pen.
After the decision of the British people to leave the EU, it is time to start assessing how EU politics
and the EU’s institutions will move forward in the absence of the UK. One area that has not received much attention
yet is the European Parliament and the interactions between parliamentary groupings, as well as the politics within
and between European party families.
Even though the details and timetable of the EU-UK divorce are still unclear, it should be expected that the
European elections in 2019 will not be held in the UK and that the next European Parliament will not contain British
MEPs. This does not seem so dramatic in terms of numbers. The UK currently has 73 of the 751 Members of the
European Parliament – a bit less than 10% of the total. Yet the way these MEPs are distributed among party groups
currently implies some signiﬁcant changes in the dynamics of the EP after 2019.
The impact on the EPP
For the biggest European party family and EP group, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP), Brexit
represents a major blow. Even though the practical impact on the EPP will be minimal, since the British
Conservatives had already left the EPP in 2009, Brexit signiﬁcantly weakens the centre-right agenda in a broad
range of issues: completion of the common market, more international trade, a stronger transatlantic link, and a
tougher stance against Vladimir Putin’s Russia.
Brexit will also complicate the relationships inside the EPP family. A more assertive role of France in a post-Brexit
EU will perhaps be mirrored in an equally assertive presence of the French Gaullists under the leadership of Nicolas
Sarkozy who, in attempting his comeback, will be tempted to emphasise his diﬀerences with Angela Merkel on
issues ranging from the economy to migration. The exit of the UK is a severe blow to the inﬂuence of economically
liberal parties from post-communist countries, like the Polish Civic Platform, while the populist overtones of the
British referendum campaign will embolden nationalist and anti-immigration voices inside the EPP, led by Hungary’s
Viktor Orban.
A blow for the S&D
For the socialist and social-democratic party family the departure of the UK will be a blow of immense proportions.
Once the source of fresh ideas about the future of social democracy in Europe, the Labour Party will exit the
parliamentary group of the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) at a time of severe challenges for the centre-left.
Currently Labour has 20 MEPs who make up just 10.5% of S&D’s membership. Yet the departure of Labour can
have signiﬁcant consequences for the balance between the diﬀerent sub-streams of the centre-left in the EP.
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Today there is a balance between northern and Mediterranean MEPs in the S&D group: 72 from northern countries
versus 74 from the Mediterranean (including France). The other 43 MEPs are from the post-communist east. The
divide between northern social-democratic and southern socialist parties has historically been a signiﬁcant one for
the centre-left. In the context of the Eurozone crisis, this becomes even more important as it reﬂects the diﬀerent
sides of the lender/borrower divide with respect to bailouts and austerity.
After Brexit, the camp of northern social democratic parties will lose one of its most important members. An S&D
group under the stronger inﬂuence of parties from southern countries will be a more diﬃcult partner to the austerity-
committed EPP. Given that the grand coalition between the two big party families has historically provided the
backbone of policymaking in the EP, the exit of pro-market and pro-reform Labour may have important implications
for the eﬀectiveness of the EP’s role in EU governance.
The eﬀect on ALDE
The liberal party family of the Alliance for Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE) has historically formed the third
largest group in the EP. Even though their clout has decreased since the 2004 enlargement, liberals have formed an
integral part of winning coalitions in the EP together with either the EPP or S&D and more usually with both.
For the liberals the loss of the UK will be crippling. The British Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems) have for long been one
of the two major parties in the group and the family – the other being the German FDP. Lib Dem MEPs have over
the years taken leading roles in the group and the EP as a whole. The departure of the Lib Dems will mean a severe
loss of political talent for ALDE.
With the Lib Dems out, ALDE’s relative strength in European politics and their capacity to act as a bridge between
the left and right will further decrease, especially since liberals are weak in most other big EU member-states. The
rise of Ciudadanos in Spain will only partially compensate for the departure of the Lib Dems.
A consolidation of Eurosceptic parties
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Finally, Brexit will trigger important developments in the right end of the political spectrum. Currently two of the three
groupings to the right of the EPP are vehicles for the agendas of British parties. The European Conservatives and
Reformists (ECR) group was created by the British Conservatives after they left the EPP. Further to the right, the
Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy (EFDD) group has for years served as UKIP’s platform. Even though
after the EP elections of 2014 UKIP accepted into the EFDD Italy’s Five Star Movement and its large number of
MEPs, UKIP still provides half of EFDD MEPs. It is safe to assume that, deprived of their British founders, the ECR
and EFDD will not survive after 2019.
With the Conservatives and UKIP out, the Eurosceptic right will be weakened somewhat in the EP. Currently all
forces to the right of the EPP occupy 23% of seats, but in a UK-less EP that percentage would fall to 19% (based on
the results of the 2014 elections). But the ECR’s and EFDD’s disappearance leaves the space open for the Europe
of Nations and Freedom (ENF) to become the main expression of the Eurosceptic right in the EP.
The ENF is an eﬀort to create an EP group of ﬁve of the most prominent populist radical right parties in Europe: the
French Front National, the Dutch PVV, the Lega Nord from Italy, the Austrian FPO and the Flemish Vlaams Belang.
Their attempts to reach the threshold of representation from at least seven member-states required to create an EP
group were repeatedly unsuccessful. But in the summer of 2015 they cleared this threshold by attracting a number
of wavering MEPs from other right-wing groups.
With neither the ECR nor the EFDD around, it is almost certain that the ENF will ﬁnd it easy to attract MEPs from
other countries after the 2019 European elections and thus reinforce its group. With the British parties out of the
picture there is little to keep the ENF from ﬁnally establishing itself as the main force to the right of the EPP. Thus an
eﬀect of Brexit will be to consolidate the representation of Euroscepticism in the EP around the populist radical right
and facilitate transnational cooperation of the far right, something it has historically been quite ineﬀective at .
In conclusion, Brexit will upset many ﬁnely negotiated compromises in the parliamentary and transnational politics of
the EU. It may embolden sovereigntist forces inside the EPP. It can tilt the balance in favour of the southern, anti-
austerity contingent of the centre-left, thus pushing the S&D to the left and making cooperation with the EPP more
diﬃcult. It will weaken ALDE and its role as a bridge-maker between left and right. Finally, it will facilitate the
consolidation of Eurosceptic and nationalist forces to the right of the EPP around Le Pen and Wilders’ ENF, a far
more radical and authoritarian grouping than the ECR or EFDD. The aggregate eﬀect of these developments is that
cooperation within and between party families will be more diﬃcult after 2019, adding further complications to EU
policymaking.
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